Kez/nodejs/packages/kez-core/test/sigchain.test.ts
Tudisco d0db6f00f1 Initial implementation of KEZ — protocol, two impls, and storage server
KEZ is a portable, decentralized identity graph: a person signs claims
linking their many accounts, publishes those claims in places only the
claimed account can publish to, and anyone can verify the connections
without trusting a central server.

Layout
------
- SPEC.md            Language-agnostic protocol spec (v0.2)
- rust/              Rust implementation: kez-core, kez-channels, kez-cli
- nodejs/            TypeScript port at full parity
- rust-sig-server/   Optional axum + SQLite storage server for sigchains
- crosstest.sh       Cross-implementation interop harness

Capabilities (both implementations, byte-compatible)
----------------------------------------------------
- Two primary-key algorithms: nostr/secp256k1 Schnorr (BIP-340) and
  Ed25519 (RFC 8032). Identifiers: nostr:npub1... and ed25519:<hex>.
- JCS (RFC 8785) canonicalization for everything signed.
- Four proof encodings: JSON envelope, compact (kez:z1:<base64url(zstd(json))>),
  Markdown fence, DNS TXT.
- Five channel plugins (no API keys, no auth needed for any of them):
    dns:        system resolver, _kez.<domain> TXT records
    github:     public gist scan + <user>/<user> profile README fallback
    nostr:      kind-30078 events from default relays
    bluesky:    public AppView author feed
    ap:         WebFinger + actor JSON (alias mastodon:)
- Identical CLI surface:
    kez identity new [--key-type nostr|ed25519]
    kez claim create <subject> (--nsec | --ed25519-seed) [--format ...] [--out ...]
    kez claim dns <domain>     (--nsec | --ed25519-seed)
    kez verify file <path>
    kez verify id <identifier>
    kez sigchain add|revoke|show|export|publish
- Sigchains: append-only signed log per primary, hash-chained per spec §6,
  stored locally at ~/.kez/sigchains/, exportable as JSONL or kez:zc1: bundle.
- Sigchain publish destinations: chain server, web (file dump), DNS (zone
  record print), nostr (kind-30078 wrapping event).

kez-sig-server
--------------
Optional storage tier. Axum + SQLite, single binary, no external deps.

- No auth — the cryptography is the access control. The server validates
  every signature, every seq, every prev hash before storing.
- REST API: POST /v1/sigchains/{scheme}/{id}/events (append signed event,
  201 with new head hash or 4xx); GET /{scheme}/{id} (full chain as JSONL);
  GET /head; GET /healthz.
- Designed for one central instance for now; the design doesn't preclude
  running more later (clients gain a configurable list, verifiers
  reconcile per spec §6.2).
- Channel-based publishing remains the always-available fallback if the
  server is unavailable.

Tests
-----
- rust/                 99 tests
- rust-sig-server/      10 integration tests (real HTTP, real SQLite)
- nodejs/               91 tests (vitest)
- crosstest.sh          19 cross-impl scenarios — proves JCS bytes,
                        Schnorr + Ed25519 sigs, all four claim encodings,
                        and the sigchain JSONL bundle are byte-compatible
                        between Rust and Node in both directions.

What's not done yet
-------------------
- verify id consulting the sigchain for revocations (data path exists,
  just not wired into the verifier output).
- rotate and add_device sigchain ops (types reserved).
- expires_at enforcement during claim verification.
- Typed VerificationStatus.status reflecting the five failure modes.
- Auth-required publishers (GitHub gist, Bluesky, ActivityPub).
2026-05-24 14:41:00 -06:00

161 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
COMPACT_CHAIN_PREFIX,
Ed25519Secret,
Identity,
NostrSecret,
Sigchain,
SigchainError,
newAddPayload,
signSigchainEvent,
} from "../src/index.js";
function fresh() {
const s = NostrSecret.generate();
const id = Identity.parse(`nostr:${s.npub()}`);
return { secret: s, primary: id };
}
describe("Sigchain", () => {
it("appends and validates an add event", () => {
const { secret, primary } = fresh();
const chain = Sigchain.create(primary);
expect(chain.isEmpty).toBe(true);
expect(chain.nextSeq()).toBe(0);
const subject = Identity.parse("github:jason");
chain.signAdd(subject, undefined, secret);
expect(chain.length).toBe(1);
expect(chain.nextSeq()).toBe(1);
expect(chain.isActive(subject)).toBe(true);
expect(chain.isRevoked(subject)).toBe(false);
expect(() => chain.validate()).not.toThrow();
});
it("revoke flips isActive/isRevoked", () => {
const { secret, primary } = fresh();
const chain = Sigchain.create(primary);
const subject = Identity.parse("github:jason");
chain.signAdd(subject, undefined, secret);
chain.signRevoke(subject, secret);
expect(chain.isRevoked(subject)).toBe(true);
expect(chain.isActive(subject)).toBe(false);
expect(() => chain.validate()).not.toThrow();
});
it("rejects events for a different primary", () => {
const a = fresh();
const b = fresh();
const chain = Sigchain.create(a.primary);
const payload = newAddPayload(
b.primary, // wrong
0,
undefined,
Identity.parse("github:jason"),
undefined,
new Date(),
);
const signed = signSigchainEvent(payload, a.secret);
expect(() => chain.append(signed)).toThrow(SigchainError);
try {
chain.append(signed);
} catch (e) {
expect((e as SigchainError).code).toBe("WrongPrimary");
}
});
it("rejects seq skip", () => {
const { secret, primary } = fresh();
const chain = Sigchain.create(primary);
chain.signAdd(Identity.parse("github:a"), undefined, secret);
// hand-craft seq=2 with correct prev
const payload = newAddPayload(
primary,
2,
chain.headHash(),
Identity.parse("github:b"),
undefined,
new Date(),
);
const signed = signSigchainEvent(payload, secret);
try {
chain.append(signed);
expect.fail("expected SigchainError");
} catch (e) {
expect((e as SigchainError).code).toBe("SeqMismatch");
}
});
it("rejects bad prev hash", () => {
const { secret, primary } = fresh();
const chain = Sigchain.create(primary);
chain.signAdd(Identity.parse("github:a"), undefined, secret);
const payload = newAddPayload(
primary,
1,
"sha256:0000",
Identity.parse("github:b"),
undefined,
new Date(),
);
const signed = signSigchainEvent(payload, secret);
try {
chain.append(signed);
expect.fail("expected SigchainError");
} catch (e) {
expect((e as SigchainError).code).toBe("PrevMismatch");
}
});
it("round-trips JSONL", () => {
const { secret, primary } = fresh();
const chain = Sigchain.create(primary);
const subject = Identity.parse("github:jason");
chain.signAdd(subject, undefined, secret);
chain.signRevoke(subject, secret);
const jsonl = chain.toJsonl();
const restored = Sigchain.fromJsonl(jsonl);
expect(restored.length).toBe(chain.length);
expect(restored.isRevoked(subject)).toBe(true);
expect(restored.headHash()).toBe(chain.headHash());
});
it("round-trips compact bundle", () => {
const { secret, primary } = fresh();
const chain = Sigchain.create(primary);
chain.signAdd(Identity.parse("github:jason"), undefined, secret);
chain.signAdd(Identity.parse("dns:example.com"), undefined, secret);
const compact = chain.toCompactBundle();
expect(compact.startsWith(COMPACT_CHAIN_PREFIX)).toBe(true);
const restored = Sigchain.fromCompactBundle(compact);
expect(restored.length).toBe(2);
expect(restored.headHash()).toBe(chain.headHash());
});
it("fromJsonl detects tampering", () => {
const { secret, primary } = fresh();
const chain = Sigchain.create(primary);
chain.signAdd(Identity.parse("github:a"), undefined, secret);
chain.signAdd(Identity.parse("github:b"), undefined, secret);
let jsonl = chain.toJsonl();
jsonl = jsonl.replace("github:b", "github:c");
try {
Sigchain.fromJsonl(jsonl);
expect.fail("expected SigchainError");
} catch (e) {
const code = (e as SigchainError).code;
expect(["BadSignature", "PrevMismatch"]).toContain(code);
}
});
it("works with ed25519 signer", () => {
const secret = Ed25519Secret.generate();
const primary = secret.identity();
const chain = Sigchain.create(primary);
const subject = Identity.parse("github:jason");
chain.signAdd(subject, undefined, secret);
expect(chain.isActive(subject)).toBe(true);
expect(() => chain.validate()).not.toThrow();
});
});