ea139641e3
Touch ID / Face ID / Windows Hello / Android fingerprint / YubiKey
(PRF-capable) can now unlock the local seed without typing the
passphrase. Fully client-side — the server has zero visibility into
the credential or the derived key.
How it works (WebAuthn PRF extension):
1. Setup (Dashboard → "Quick unlock" → "Set up biometric unlock"):
• Register a platform credential with prf:{} in extensions.
• If the authenticator returns prf.enabled, immediately
getAssertion() with a random 32-byte salt to retrieve a
deterministic 32-byte secret (the "PRF output").
• AES-GCM(seed) under that secret → store the blob, salt, nonce,
and credentialId in a separate IDB entry from the passphrase
blob.
2. Unlock (Unlock page → big "Unlock with Touch ID" button):
• getAssertion() with the stored credentialId + salt → same
32-byte secret → AES-GCM decrypt → seed.
• unlockWithSeed() (new helper in identity-store) merges the
seed with handle/server/primary metadata to rebuild the
UnlockedIdentity session shape.
Trust properties (intentional):
• Passphrase blob stays in place as the authoritative backup.
Biometric is purely additive — wipe your browser profile or lose
the device, passphrase still works on any device where you
re-import the seed.
• PRF output never leaves the browser. The authenticator is the
only thing that can produce it, and only with the matching salt
+ credentialId we stored.
• Disable → just deletes the IDB entry; the registered credential
on the device still exists but is unused. (User can also clear
it from their OS / passkey manager.)
Browser support gating:
• Dashboard panel renders "no platform authenticator detected" if
isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() returns false.
• Setup fails with a clear error if PRF isn't supported by the
authenticator (older YubiKeys, some password managers).
• Unlock page falls back to passphrase form automatically if
biometric fails (cancelled, sensor error, etc.).
Live at https://kez.lat (asset index-Df_F5lEP.js).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
KEZ
KEZ is a portable, decentralized identity graph. It lets a person say:
"These accounts, keys, domains, and identities are all me."
…without depending on any central authority. Every connection is proven by a cryptographic signature against a key the user already controls (a nostr key, an Ed25519 key, etc.), and the proofs are published in places only the claimed account itself can publish to (their gist, their DNS, their nostr relay event). Anyone can verify the graph without trusting a server.
Repository layout
.
├── SPEC.md ← The protocol. Language-agnostic, normative.
├── rust/ ← Rust implementation (kez-core, kez-channels, kez-cli)
├── nodejs/ ← TypeScript/Node implementation (same shape, same CLI)
├── rust-sig-server/ ← Optional HTTP store for sigchains (axum + SQLite)
├── crosstest.sh ← Interop test: artifacts move between implementations
└── README.md ← (this file)
Two parallel implementations. Wire-compatible: a claim signed in Rust verifies in Node and vice versa. The cross-test harness proves it.
A separate rust-sig-server/ crate provides an optional
HTTP storage tier for sigchains — useful when a user doesn't want to set up
DNS/hosting/nostr, but never required; the protocol stays decentralized.
Documentation
Start here:
SPEC.md— the language-agnostic protocol spec (v0.2). Normative for every implementation.rust/README.md— Rust implementation guide: crate layout (kez-core/kez-channels/kez-cli), full CLI reference, channel plugin model, library examples, and the gap list.nodejs/README.md— Node/TypeScript port: same shape as Rust, npm workspaces layout, crypto stack rationale, CLI reference.rust-sig-server/README.md— the optional storage server: API reference, no-auth design + threat model, deployment recipes (bare-metal, Docker, PaaS), and how channel-based publishing remains the fallback if the server is down.
Quick start
Rust
cd rust
cargo build
cargo test # 99 tests
cargo install --path crates/kez-cli # → `kez` on PATH
kez verify id github:jason
Full guide: rust/README.md.
Node.js
cd nodejs
npm install
npm test # 91 tests
npm run cli -- verify id github:jason
Full guide: nodejs/README.md.
Sigchain storage server (optional)
cd rust-sig-server
cargo build --release
./target/release/kez-sig-server # listens on :7878
Full guide: rust-sig-server/README.md.
Cross-testing
./crosstest.sh
Runs 19 scenarios that swap implementations at the artifact boundary:
| # | Scenario |
|---|---|
| 1–2 | nostr-signed JSON claim, both directions |
| 3–4 | nostr-signed compact claim, both directions |
| 5–6 | nostr-signed markdown claim, both directions |
| 7–8 | nostr-signed DNS zone form, both directions |
| 9–10 | ed25519-signed JSON claim, both directions |
| 11–12 | ed25519-signed compact claim, both directions |
| 13–14 | ed25519-signed markdown claim, both directions |
| 15 | rust builds 3-event nostr sigchain → node parses + shows |
| 16 | rust-exported sigchain JSONL == node-exported JSONL (byte-identical) |
| 17 | node builds 3-event nostr sigchain → rust parses + shows |
| 18 | rust builds ed25519 sigchain → node parses + shows |
| 19 | node builds ed25519 sigchain → rust parses + shows |
If all 19 pass: JCS canonicalization, both signature suites (BIP-340 Schnorr
and Ed25519), the compact kez:z1: zstd+base64url encoding, the Markdown
fence, the DNS TXT shape, and the sigchain JSONL bundle format are all
byte-compatible across implementations.
Pass -v for verbose output (echoes intermediate commands and proofs).
What ships in v0.2
- Five channel plugins in each implementation:
dns:,github:,nostr:,bluesky:,ap:(aliasmastodon:). - Four wire encodings: JSON, compact, Markdown fence, DNS TXT.
- Two primary-key algorithms: nostr/secp256k1 Schnorr (BIP-340) and Ed25519 (RFC 8032).
- JCS (RFC 8785) canonicalization for everything signed.
- No API keys required for any channel.
What's not done yet
Tracked in rust/README.md and the
spec:
verify idconsulting the sigchain. Sigchain types, CLI commands (kez sigchain add/revoke/show/export/publish), and the storage server all exist. But proof verification doesn't yet fetch the chain to check for revocations — everyverifyis still a single one-shot proof check.rotateandadd_devicesigchain ops.expires_atenforcement during claim verify.- Typed
VerificationStatus.statusreflecting the five failure modes (valid/revoked/expired/unreachable/fork). - Auth-required publishers (GitHub gist, Bluesky, ActivityPub).
License
Dual-licensed under MIT or Apache-2.0.