Tudisco d0db6f00f1 Initial implementation of KEZ — protocol, two impls, and storage server
KEZ is a portable, decentralized identity graph: a person signs claims
linking their many accounts, publishes those claims in places only the
claimed account can publish to, and anyone can verify the connections
without trusting a central server.

Layout
------
- SPEC.md            Language-agnostic protocol spec (v0.2)
- rust/              Rust implementation: kez-core, kez-channels, kez-cli
- nodejs/            TypeScript port at full parity
- rust-sig-server/   Optional axum + SQLite storage server for sigchains
- crosstest.sh       Cross-implementation interop harness

Capabilities (both implementations, byte-compatible)
----------------------------------------------------
- Two primary-key algorithms: nostr/secp256k1 Schnorr (BIP-340) and
  Ed25519 (RFC 8032). Identifiers: nostr:npub1... and ed25519:<hex>.
- JCS (RFC 8785) canonicalization for everything signed.
- Four proof encodings: JSON envelope, compact (kez:z1:<base64url(zstd(json))>),
  Markdown fence, DNS TXT.
- Five channel plugins (no API keys, no auth needed for any of them):
    dns:        system resolver, _kez.<domain> TXT records
    github:     public gist scan + <user>/<user> profile README fallback
    nostr:      kind-30078 events from default relays
    bluesky:    public AppView author feed
    ap:         WebFinger + actor JSON (alias mastodon:)
- Identical CLI surface:
    kez identity new [--key-type nostr|ed25519]
    kez claim create <subject> (--nsec | --ed25519-seed) [--format ...] [--out ...]
    kez claim dns <domain>     (--nsec | --ed25519-seed)
    kez verify file <path>
    kez verify id <identifier>
    kez sigchain add|revoke|show|export|publish
- Sigchains: append-only signed log per primary, hash-chained per spec §6,
  stored locally at ~/.kez/sigchains/, exportable as JSONL or kez:zc1: bundle.
- Sigchain publish destinations: chain server, web (file dump), DNS (zone
  record print), nostr (kind-30078 wrapping event).

kez-sig-server
--------------
Optional storage tier. Axum + SQLite, single binary, no external deps.

- No auth — the cryptography is the access control. The server validates
  every signature, every seq, every prev hash before storing.
- REST API: POST /v1/sigchains/{scheme}/{id}/events (append signed event,
  201 with new head hash or 4xx); GET /{scheme}/{id} (full chain as JSONL);
  GET /head; GET /healthz.
- Designed for one central instance for now; the design doesn't preclude
  running more later (clients gain a configurable list, verifiers
  reconcile per spec §6.2).
- Channel-based publishing remains the always-available fallback if the
  server is unavailable.

Tests
-----
- rust/                 99 tests
- rust-sig-server/      10 integration tests (real HTTP, real SQLite)
- nodejs/               91 tests (vitest)
- crosstest.sh          19 cross-impl scenarios — proves JCS bytes,
                        Schnorr + Ed25519 sigs, all four claim encodings,
                        and the sigchain JSONL bundle are byte-compatible
                        between Rust and Node in both directions.

What's not done yet
-------------------
- verify id consulting the sigchain for revocations (data path exists,
  just not wired into the verifier output).
- rotate and add_device sigchain ops (types reserved).
- expires_at enforcement during claim verification.
- Typed VerificationStatus.status reflecting the five failure modes.
- Auth-required publishers (GitHub gist, Bluesky, ActivityPub).
2026-05-24 14:41:00 -06:00

151 lines
5.4 KiB
Rust

//! Integration tests for the nostr channel using a fake `NostrFetcher`.
//! The real fetcher uses websockets to live relays; tests substitute
//! canned events so they're hermetic.
use std::sync::Arc;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use chrono::Utc;
use kez_channels::nostr::{KEZ_NOSTR_KIND, NostrChannel, NostrEvent, NostrFetcher, NostrFilter};
use kez_channels::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelResult};
use kez_core::{ClaimPayload, Identity, NostrSecret, SignedClaim, nostr_pubkey_hex};
struct CapturingFetcher {
events: Vec<NostrEvent>,
expected_authors: Vec<String>,
expected_kinds: Vec<u32>,
}
#[async_trait]
impl NostrFetcher for CapturingFetcher {
async fn fetch_events(&self, filter: &NostrFilter) -> ChannelResult<Vec<NostrEvent>> {
assert_eq!(filter.authors, self.expected_authors, "wrong authors filter");
assert_eq!(filter.kinds, self.expected_kinds, "wrong kinds filter");
Ok(self.events.clone())
}
}
struct FailingFetcher;
#[async_trait]
impl NostrFetcher for FailingFetcher {
async fn fetch_events(&self, _filter: &NostrFilter) -> ChannelResult<Vec<NostrEvent>> {
Err(ChannelError::Unreachable("all relays down".into()))
}
}
fn make_event(pubkey_hex: &str, content: String) -> NostrEvent {
NostrEvent {
id: "0".repeat(64),
pubkey: pubkey_hex.to_owned(),
created_at: Utc::now().timestamp(),
kind: KEZ_NOSTR_KIND,
tags: vec![vec!["d".to_owned(), "kez".to_owned()]],
content,
sig: "f".repeat(128),
}
}
fn sign_for_self() -> (NostrSecret, Identity, SignedClaim) {
let secret = NostrSecret::generate();
let identity = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", secret.npub())).unwrap();
let signed = SignedClaim::sign(
ClaimPayload::new(identity.clone(), identity.clone(), Utc::now()),
&secret,
)
.unwrap();
(secret, identity, signed)
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn verifies_self_published_proof_from_relay() {
let (_secret, identity, signed) = sign_for_self();
let pubkey_hex = nostr_pubkey_hex(&identity).unwrap();
let compact = signed.to_compact().unwrap();
let fetcher = CapturingFetcher {
events: vec![make_event(&pubkey_hex, compact)],
expected_authors: vec![pubkey_hex.clone()],
expected_kinds: vec![KEZ_NOSTR_KIND],
};
let channel = NostrChannel::with_fetcher(Arc::new(fetcher));
let hit = channel.fetch_and_verify(&identity).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(hit.proof, signed);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn skips_events_whose_pubkey_field_mismatches() {
// Relay returns an event with a forged content-pubkey discrepancy:
// event.pubkey claims to be someone else even though the filter asked
// for `identity`. We must not trust the content in that case.
let (_secret_a, identity_a, signed_a) = sign_for_self();
let (_secret_b, identity_b, _signed_b) = sign_for_self();
let pubkey_b_hex = nostr_pubkey_hex(&identity_b).unwrap();
let compact_a = signed_a.to_compact().unwrap();
let fetcher = CapturingFetcher {
events: vec![make_event(&pubkey_b_hex, compact_a)],
expected_authors: vec![nostr_pubkey_hex(&identity_a).unwrap()],
expected_kinds: vec![KEZ_NOSTR_KIND],
};
let channel = NostrChannel::with_fetcher(Arc::new(fetcher));
let err = channel.fetch_and_verify(&identity_a).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, ChannelError::NotFound(_)),
"expected NotFound (all events rejected by author check), got {err:?}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn rejects_proof_signed_for_different_subject() {
// The event is correctly authored, but the embedded claim is for a
// different identity. The subject-mismatch check must fire.
let (secret_a, identity_a, _signed_self_a) = sign_for_self();
let (_secret_b, identity_b, _signed_self_b) = sign_for_self();
let pubkey_a_hex = nostr_pubkey_hex(&identity_a).unwrap();
// A signs a claim with subject == B (legitimate proof but for B, not A).
let claim_for_b = SignedClaim::sign(
ClaimPayload::new(identity_b.clone(), identity_a.clone(), Utc::now()),
&secret_a,
)
.unwrap();
let compact = claim_for_b.to_compact().unwrap();
let fetcher = CapturingFetcher {
events: vec![make_event(&pubkey_a_hex, compact)],
expected_authors: vec![pubkey_a_hex.clone()],
expected_kinds: vec![KEZ_NOSTR_KIND],
};
let channel = NostrChannel::with_fetcher(Arc::new(fetcher));
let err = channel.fetch_and_verify(&identity_a).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, ChannelError::SubjectMismatch { .. }),
"expected SubjectMismatch, got {err:?}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn no_events_yields_not_found() {
let (_s, identity, _signed) = sign_for_self();
let fetcher = CapturingFetcher {
events: vec![],
expected_authors: vec![nostr_pubkey_hex(&identity).unwrap()],
expected_kinds: vec![KEZ_NOSTR_KIND],
};
let channel = NostrChannel::with_fetcher(Arc::new(fetcher));
let err = channel.fetch_and_verify(&identity).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::NotFound(_)));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn fetcher_failure_surfaces_as_unreachable() {
let (_s, identity, _signed) = sign_for_self();
let channel = NostrChannel::with_fetcher(Arc::new(FailingFetcher));
let err = channel.fetch_and_verify(&identity).await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Unreachable(_)));
}