Kez/rust/crates/kez-core/src/lib.rs

use base64::Engine;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
use bech32::{FromBase32, ToBase32, Variant};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use ed25519_dalek::{
    Signature as Ed25519Signature, Signer as Ed25519Signer, SigningKey as Ed25519SigningKey,
    VerifyingKey as Ed25519VerifyingKey,
};
use rand::RngCore;
use secp256k1::schnorr::Signature;
use secp256k1::{Keypair, Message, Secp256k1, SecretKey, XOnlyPublicKey};
use serde::de::DeserializeOwned;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::fmt;
use std::str::FromStr;

pub mod mnemonic;
pub use mnemonic::{
    MnemonicWords, generate_mnemonic, mnemonic_from_seed_24, seed_from_mnemonic,
};

pub const CLAIM_TYPE: &str = "kez.claim";
pub const SIGCHAIN_EVENT_TYPE: &str = "kez.sigchain.event";
pub const FORMAT_VERSION: u8 = 1;
pub const NOSTR_SCHNORR_ALG: &str = "nostr-secp256k1-schnorr-sha256-jcs";
pub const ED25519_SHA512_ALG: &str = "ed25519-sha512-jcs";
pub const COMPACT_PROOF_PREFIX: &str = "kez:z1:";
pub const COMPACT_CHAIN_PREFIX: &str = "kez:zc1:";

#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum KezError {
    #[error("unsupported key algorithm: {0}")]
    UnsupportedAlgorithm(String),
    #[error("invalid identity: {0}")]
    InvalidIdentity(String),
    #[error("invalid nostr key")]
    InvalidNostrKey,
    #[error("invalid signature")]
    InvalidSignature,
    #[error("canonical json failed: {0}")]
    CanonicalJson(String),
    #[error("json failed: {0}")]
    Json(#[from] serde_json::Error),
    #[error("bech32 failed: {0}")]
    Bech32(#[from] bech32::Error),
    #[error("secp256k1 failed: {0}")]
    Secp256k1(#[from] secp256k1::Error),
    #[error("hex failed: {0}")]
    Hex(#[from] hex::FromHexError),
    #[error("base64 failed: {0}")]
    Base64(#[from] base64::DecodeError),
    #[error("io failed: {0}")]
    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
}

pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, KezError>;

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(transparent)]
pub struct Identity(String);

impl Identity {
    pub fn parse(value: impl AsRef<str>) -> Result<Self> {
        let raw = value.as_ref().trim();
        if raw.is_empty() {
            return Err(KezError::InvalidIdentity(raw.to_owned()));
        }

        if raw.starts_with("npub1") {
            validate_npub(raw)?;
            return Ok(Self(format!("nostr:{raw}")));
        }

        let Some((scheme, rest)) = raw.split_once(':') else {
            return Err(KezError::InvalidIdentity(raw.to_owned()));
        };

        if scheme.is_empty() || rest.is_empty() {
            return Err(KezError::InvalidIdentity(raw.to_owned()));
        }

        if scheme == "nostr" {
            validate_npub(rest)?;
        } else if scheme == "ed25519" {
            validate_ed25519_hex(rest)?;
        }

        Ok(Self(format!("{scheme}:{rest}")))
    }

    pub fn scheme(&self) -> &str {
        self.0
            .split_once(':')
            .map(|(scheme, _)| scheme)
            .unwrap_or("")
    }

    pub fn value(&self) -> &str {
        self.0.split_once(':').map(|(_, value)| value).unwrap_or("")
    }

    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str {
        &self.0
    }
}

impl fmt::Display for Identity {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
        f.write_str(&self.0)
    }
}

impl FromStr for Identity {
    type Err = KezError;

    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self> {
        Self::parse(s)
    }
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ClaimPayload {
    #[serde(rename = "type")]
    pub kind: String,
    pub version: u8,
    pub subject: Identity,
    pub primary: Identity,
    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub expires_at: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
}

impl ClaimPayload {
    pub fn new(subject: Identity, primary: Identity, created_at: DateTime<Utc>) -> Self {
        Self {
            kind: CLAIM_TYPE.to_owned(),
            version: FORMAT_VERSION,
            subject,
            primary,
            created_at,
            expires_at: None,
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SignatureBlock {
    pub alg: String,
    pub key: Identity,
    pub sig: String,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SignedClaim {
    pub kez: String,
    pub payload: ClaimPayload,
    pub signature: SignatureBlock,
}

/// A signing key of either supported type. Lets `SignedClaim::sign_with`
/// dispatch on the underlying algorithm without exposing two near-identical
/// entry points.
pub enum Signer<'a> {
    Nostr(&'a NostrSecret),
    Ed25519(&'a Ed25519Secret),
}

impl SignedClaim {
    /// Sign with a nostr/secp256k1 primary key (back-compat convenience).
    pub fn sign(payload: ClaimPayload, signer: &NostrSecret) -> Result<Self> {
        Self::sign_with(payload, Signer::Nostr(signer))
    }

    /// Sign with an Ed25519 primary key (back-compat convenience).
    pub fn sign_ed25519(payload: ClaimPayload, signer: &Ed25519Secret) -> Result<Self> {
        Self::sign_with(payload, Signer::Ed25519(signer))
    }

    /// Unified signing entry: dispatches on the signer type.
    pub fn sign_with(payload: ClaimPayload, signer: Signer<'_>) -> Result<Self> {
        let (alg, key, sig_hex) = match signer {
            Signer::Nostr(s) => {
                let key = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", s.npub()))?;
                let sig = sign_jcs_schnorr_hex(&payload, s)?;
                (NOSTR_SCHNORR_ALG.to_owned(), key, sig)
            }
            Signer::Ed25519(s) => {
                let key = s.identity()?;
                let jcs = canonical_bytes(&payload)?;
                let sig = s.sign(&jcs);
                (ED25519_SHA512_ALG.to_owned(), key, hex::encode(sig))
            }
        };
        Ok(Self {
            kez: "claim".to_owned(),
            payload,
            signature: SignatureBlock {
                alg,
                key,
                sig: sig_hex,
            },
        })
    }

    pub fn verify(&self) -> Result<VerificationStatus> {
        if self.signature.key != self.payload.primary {
            return Err(KezError::InvalidSignature);
        }

        match self.signature.alg.as_str() {
            NOSTR_SCHNORR_ALG => {
                verify_jcs_schnorr_hex(
                    &self.payload,
                    self.signature.key.value(),
                    &self.signature.sig,
                )?;
            }
            ED25519_SHA512_ALG => {
                let jcs = canonical_bytes(&self.payload)?;
                verify_ed25519_hex(self.signature.key.value(), &jcs, &self.signature.sig)?;
            }
            other => return Err(KezError::UnsupportedAlgorithm(other.to_owned())),
        }

        Ok(VerificationStatus {
            primary: self.payload.primary.clone(),
            verified: vec![self.payload.subject.clone()],
            status: "valid".to_owned(),
            confidence: "strong".to_owned(),
        })
    }

    pub fn to_pretty_json(&self) -> Result<String> {
        Ok(serde_json::to_string_pretty(self)?)
    }

    pub fn to_markdown_proof(&self) -> Result<String> {
        let json = self.to_pretty_json()?;
        Ok(format!(
            "# KEZ Proof\n\nThis account publishes a signed KEZ identity claim.\n\n- Primary: `{}`\n- Subject: `{}`\n- Created: `{}`\n\n```kez\n{}\n```\n",
            self.payload.primary, self.payload.subject, self.payload.created_at, json
        ))
    }

    pub fn to_compact(&self) -> Result<String> {
        encode_compact_claim(self)
    }
}

/// Spec §6 sigchain event payload. JCS-canonicalized + signed.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SigchainEventPayload {
    #[serde(rename = "type")]
    pub kind: String,
    pub version: u8,
    /// The primary key this event belongs to. After a `rotate`, this is
    /// the new primary; before, the old one.
    pub primary: Identity,
    pub seq: u64,
    /// `sha256:<hex>` of JCS of the prior signed envelope. None iff `seq == 0`.
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub prev: Option<String>,
    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
    /// Operation name: "add" | "revoke" | "rotate" | "add_device".
    pub op: String,
    /// Op-specific fields, kept as Value so the schema can grow without a
    /// breaking type change.
    pub payload: serde_json::Value,
}

/// Convenience constructors for the supported ops. Use these instead of
/// hand-rolling `op`/`payload` strings so impls stay consistent.
impl SigchainEventPayload {
    /// `add` op: assert that `primary` controls `subject`.
    pub fn new_add(
        primary: Identity,
        seq: u64,
        prev: Option<String>,
        subject: Identity,
        proof_url: Option<String>,
        created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
    ) -> Self {
        let mut payload = serde_json::Map::new();
        payload.insert("subject".to_owned(), serde_json::json!(subject));
        if let Some(url) = proof_url {
            payload.insert("proof_url".to_owned(), serde_json::json!(url));
        }
        Self {
            kind: SIGCHAIN_EVENT_TYPE.to_owned(),
            version: FORMAT_VERSION,
            primary,
            seq,
            prev,
            created_at,
            op: "add".to_owned(),
            payload: serde_json::Value::Object(payload),
        }
    }

    /// `revoke` op: retract a previously-added subject.
    pub fn new_revoke(
        primary: Identity,
        seq: u64,
        prev: Option<String>,
        subject: Identity,
        created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            kind: SIGCHAIN_EVENT_TYPE.to_owned(),
            version: FORMAT_VERSION,
            primary,
            seq,
            prev,
            created_at,
            op: "revoke".to_owned(),
            payload: serde_json::json!({ "subject": subject }),
        }
    }

    /// Pull the `subject` field out of an add/revoke payload, if present.
    pub fn subject(&self) -> Option<Identity> {
        self.payload
            .get("subject")
            .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
            .and_then(|s| Identity::parse(s).ok())
    }
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SignedSigchainEvent {
    pub kez: String,
    pub payload: SigchainEventPayload,
    pub signature: SignatureBlock,
}

impl SignedSigchainEvent {
    /// Sign with a nostr key (back-compat convenience).
    pub fn sign(payload: SigchainEventPayload, signer: &NostrSecret) -> Result<Self> {
        Self::sign_with(payload, Signer::Nostr(signer))
    }

    /// Sign with an Ed25519 key.
    pub fn sign_ed25519(
        payload: SigchainEventPayload,
        signer: &Ed25519Secret,
    ) -> Result<Self> {
        Self::sign_with(payload, Signer::Ed25519(signer))
    }

    /// Unified signing entry — same dispatch as `SignedClaim::sign_with`.
    pub fn sign_with(payload: SigchainEventPayload, signer: Signer<'_>) -> Result<Self> {
        let (alg, key, sig_hex) = match signer {
            Signer::Nostr(s) => {
                let key = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", s.npub()))?;
                let sig = sign_jcs_schnorr_hex(&payload, s)?;
                (NOSTR_SCHNORR_ALG.to_owned(), key, sig)
            }
            Signer::Ed25519(s) => {
                let key = s.identity()?;
                let jcs = canonical_bytes(&payload)?;
                let sig = s.sign(&jcs);
                (ED25519_SHA512_ALG.to_owned(), key, hex::encode(sig))
            }
        };
        Ok(Self {
            kez: "sigchain_event".to_owned(),
            payload,
            signature: SignatureBlock {
                alg,
                key,
                sig: sig_hex,
            },
        })
    }

    /// Verify the signature over `payload`. Dispatches on `signature.alg`.
    pub fn verify(&self) -> Result<()> {
        if self.signature.key != self.payload.primary {
            return Err(KezError::InvalidSignature);
        }
        match self.signature.alg.as_str() {
            NOSTR_SCHNORR_ALG => verify_jcs_schnorr_hex(
                &self.payload,
                self.signature.key.value(),
                &self.signature.sig,
            ),
            ED25519_SHA512_ALG => {
                let jcs = canonical_bytes(&self.payload)?;
                verify_ed25519_hex(self.signature.key.value(), &jcs, &self.signature.sig)
            }
            other => Err(KezError::UnsupportedAlgorithm(other.to_owned())),
        }
    }

    /// `sha256:<hex>` of the JCS-canonicalized envelope. Used by `prev`
    /// on the next event in the chain.
    pub fn hash(&self) -> Result<String> {
        let bytes = canonical_bytes(self)?;
        Ok(format!("sha256:{}", hex::encode(Sha256::digest(bytes))))
    }
}

// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Sigchain — append-only, validated chain of signed events for one primary.
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SigchainError {
    #[error("expected primary {expected}, got {found}")]
    WrongPrimary { expected: Identity, found: Identity },
    #[error("expected seq {expected}, got {found}")]
    SeqMismatch { expected: u64, found: u64 },
    #[error("prev hash mismatch: expected {expected:?}, got {found:?}")]
    PrevMismatch {
        expected: Option<String>,
        found: Option<String>,
    },
    #[error("signature failed: {0}")]
    BadSignature(#[from] KezError),
    #[error("envelope tag must be \"sigchain_event\", got {0:?}")]
    WrongEnvelopeTag(String),
    #[error("sigchain is empty")]
    Empty,
    #[error("invalid JSONL: {0}")]
    BadJsonl(String),
}

/// An ordered, validated chain of signed events for a single primary.
/// All mutations go through `append` (or the `sign_*` helpers), which
/// enforce the spec §6.2 integrity rules.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Sigchain {
    primary: Identity,
    events: Vec<SignedSigchainEvent>,
}

impl Sigchain {
    /// Create an empty sigchain for `primary`. The first appended event
    /// must have seq 0 and no prev.
    pub fn new(primary: Identity) -> Self {
        Self {
            primary,
            events: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    pub fn primary(&self) -> &Identity {
        &self.primary
    }

    pub fn head(&self) -> Option<&SignedSigchainEvent> {
        self.events.last()
    }

    /// `sha256:<hex>` of the head envelope. `None` iff the chain is empty.
    pub fn head_hash(&self) -> Result<Option<String>> {
        match self.head() {
            None => Ok(None),
            Some(head) => Ok(Some(head.hash()?)),
        }
    }

    /// The seq the next appended event must use.
    pub fn next_seq(&self) -> u64 {
        self.events.last().map(|e| e.payload.seq + 1).unwrap_or(0)
    }

    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
        self.events.len()
    }

    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
        self.events.is_empty()
    }

    pub fn events(&self) -> &[SignedSigchainEvent] {
        &self.events
    }

    /// Append a signed event. Validates: envelope tag, primary, seq
    /// monotonicity, prev hash chain, and signature.
    pub fn append(&mut self, event: SignedSigchainEvent) -> std::result::Result<(), SigchainError> {
        if event.kez != "sigchain_event" {
            return Err(SigchainError::WrongEnvelopeTag(event.kez.clone()));
        }
        if event.payload.primary != self.primary {
            return Err(SigchainError::WrongPrimary {
                expected: self.primary.clone(),
                found: event.payload.primary.clone(),
            });
        }
        let expected_seq = self.next_seq();
        if event.payload.seq != expected_seq {
            return Err(SigchainError::SeqMismatch {
                expected: expected_seq,
                found: event.payload.seq,
            });
        }
        let expected_prev = self.head_hash()?;
        if event.payload.prev != expected_prev {
            return Err(SigchainError::PrevMismatch {
                expected: expected_prev,
                found: event.payload.prev.clone(),
            });
        }
        event.verify()?;
        self.events.push(event);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Full-chain re-validation (signatures + integrity). Useful after
    /// loading from external storage.
    pub fn validate(&self) -> std::result::Result<(), SigchainError> {
        let mut rebuilt = Sigchain::new(self.primary.clone());
        for event in &self.events {
            rebuilt.append(event.clone())?;
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// True if the most recent op for `subject` is `revoke`. False if the
    /// most recent op is `add` or the subject was never added.
    pub fn is_revoked(&self, subject: &Identity) -> bool {
        for event in self.events.iter().rev() {
            let Some(s) = event.payload.subject() else {
                continue;
            };
            if &s == subject {
                return event.payload.op == "revoke";
            }
        }
        false
    }

    /// True if `subject` was added (and not later revoked).
    pub fn is_active(&self, subject: &Identity) -> bool {
        for event in self.events.iter().rev() {
            let Some(s) = event.payload.subject() else {
                continue;
            };
            if &s == subject {
                return event.payload.op == "add";
            }
        }
        false
    }

    /// Convenience: build, sign, and append an `add` event in one call.
    pub fn sign_add(
        &mut self,
        subject: Identity,
        proof_url: Option<String>,
        signer: Signer<'_>,
    ) -> std::result::Result<&SignedSigchainEvent, SigchainError> {
        let prev = self.head_hash()?;
        let payload = SigchainEventPayload::new_add(
            self.primary.clone(),
            self.next_seq(),
            prev,
            subject,
            proof_url,
            Utc::now(),
        );
        let signed = SignedSigchainEvent::sign_with(payload, signer)?;
        self.append(signed)?;
        Ok(self.events.last().unwrap())
    }

    /// Convenience: build, sign, and append a `revoke` event.
    pub fn sign_revoke(
        &mut self,
        subject: Identity,
        signer: Signer<'_>,
    ) -> std::result::Result<&SignedSigchainEvent, SigchainError> {
        let prev = self.head_hash()?;
        let payload = SigchainEventPayload::new_revoke(
            self.primary.clone(),
            self.next_seq(),
            prev,
            subject,
            Utc::now(),
        );
        let signed = SignedSigchainEvent::sign_with(payload, signer)?;
        self.append(signed)?;
        Ok(self.events.last().unwrap())
    }

    /// Serialize as JSONL (one envelope per line). The portable format
    /// used by `kez sigchain export` and the chain server's GET endpoint.
    pub fn to_jsonl(&self) -> Result<String> {
        let mut out = String::new();
        for event in &self.events {
            out.push_str(&serde_json::to_string(event)?);
            out.push('\n');
        }
        Ok(out)
    }

    /// Encode the whole chain as `kez:zc1:<base64url-no-pad(zstd(jsonl))>`.
    /// Portable single-string form for embedding in nostr events, DNS TXT
    /// values, ActivityPub fields, etc.
    pub fn to_compact_bundle(&self) -> Result<String> {
        let jsonl = self.to_jsonl()?;
        let compressed = zstd::encode_all(jsonl.as_bytes(), 3)?;
        Ok(format!(
            "{COMPACT_CHAIN_PREFIX}{}",
            URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(compressed)
        ))
    }

    /// Inverse of `to_compact_bundle`.
    pub fn from_compact_bundle(value: &str) -> std::result::Result<Self, SigchainError> {
        let encoded = value.trim().strip_prefix(COMPACT_CHAIN_PREFIX).ok_or_else(|| {
            SigchainError::BadJsonl(format!("missing {COMPACT_CHAIN_PREFIX} prefix"))
        })?;
        let compressed = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
            .decode(encoded)
            .map_err(|e| SigchainError::BadJsonl(format!("base64url: {e}")))?;
        let jsonl = zstd::decode_all(compressed.as_slice())
            .map_err(|e| SigchainError::BadJsonl(format!("zstd: {e}")))?;
        let text = String::from_utf8(jsonl)
            .map_err(|e| SigchainError::BadJsonl(format!("utf8: {e}")))?;
        Self::from_jsonl(&text)
    }

    /// Parse a JSONL bundle. Validates as it appends, so the result is
    /// guaranteed to be a well-formed chain.
    pub fn from_jsonl(text: &str) -> std::result::Result<Self, SigchainError> {
        let mut lines = text.lines().filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty());
        let first = lines
            .next()
            .ok_or_else(|| SigchainError::BadJsonl("empty input".to_owned()))?;
        let first_event: SignedSigchainEvent = serde_json::from_str(first)
            .map_err(|e| SigchainError::BadJsonl(format!("line 0: {e}")))?;
        let mut chain = Sigchain::new(first_event.payload.primary.clone());
        chain.append(first_event)?;
        for (i, line) in lines.enumerate() {
            let event: SignedSigchainEvent = serde_json::from_str(line)
                .map_err(|e| SigchainError::BadJsonl(format!("line {}: {e}", i + 1)))?;
            chain.append(event)?;
        }
        Ok(chain)
    }
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct VerificationStatus {
    pub primary: Identity,
    pub verified: Vec<Identity>,
    pub status: String,
    pub confidence: String,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NostrSecret {
    secret_key: SecretKey,
}

impl NostrSecret {
    pub fn generate() -> Self {
        let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
        Self {
            secret_key: SecretKey::new(&mut rng),
        }
    }

    pub fn from_nsec(nsec: &str) -> Result<Self> {
        let (hrp, data, variant) = bech32::decode(nsec)?;
        if hrp != "nsec" || variant != Variant::Bech32 {
            return Err(KezError::InvalidNostrKey);
        }

        let bytes = Vec::<u8>::from_base32(&data)?;
        let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&bytes)?;
        Ok(Self { secret_key })
    }

    pub fn nsec(&self) -> String {
        bech32::encode(
            "nsec",
            self.secret_key.secret_bytes().to_base32(),
            Variant::Bech32,
        )
        .expect("nsec encoding cannot fail for static hrp")
    }

    pub fn npub(&self) -> String {
        let secp = Secp256k1::new();
        let keypair = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &self.secret_key);
        let (public_key, _) = XOnlyPublicKey::from_keypair(&keypair);
        bech32::encode("npub", public_key.serialize().to_base32(), Variant::Bech32)
            .expect("npub encoding cannot fail for static hrp")
    }

    /// 32-byte x-only public key as lowercase hex (the form nostr filters
    /// and event `pubkey` fields use).
    pub fn pubkey_hex(&self) -> String {
        let secp = Secp256k1::new();
        let keypair = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &self.secret_key);
        let (public_key, _) = XOnlyPublicKey::from_keypair(&keypair);
        hex::encode(public_key.serialize())
    }

    /// BIP-340 Schnorr signature over a 32-byte digest (no aux rand).
    /// Used for signing NIP-01 nostr event ids when publishing.
    pub fn sign_raw(&self, digest: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<[u8; 64]> {
        let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(digest)?;
        let secp = Secp256k1::new();
        let keypair = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &self.secret_key);
        let sig = secp.sign_schnorr_no_aux_rand(&msg, &keypair);
        Ok(*sig.as_ref())
    }
}

#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct Ed25519Secret {
    signing_key: Ed25519SigningKey,
}

impl Ed25519Secret {
    pub fn generate() -> Self {
        let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
        let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
        rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
        Self {
            signing_key: Ed25519SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed),
        }
    }

    pub fn from_seed_hex(seed_hex: &str) -> Result<Self> {
        let bytes = hex::decode(seed_hex)?;
        let seed: [u8; 32] = bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| {
            KezError::InvalidIdentity("ed25519 seed must be 32 bytes / 64 hex chars".to_owned())
        })?;
        Ok(Self {
            signing_key: Ed25519SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed),
        })
    }

    /// 32-byte seed (secret material) as lowercase hex. Anyone with this can sign as this identity.
    pub fn seed_hex(&self) -> String {
        hex::encode(self.signing_key.to_bytes())
    }

    /// 32-byte public key as lowercase hex.
    pub fn pubkey_hex(&self) -> String {
        hex::encode(self.signing_key.verifying_key().to_bytes())
    }

    pub fn identity(&self) -> Result<Identity> {
        Identity::parse(format!("ed25519:{}", self.pubkey_hex()))
    }

    /// Sign raw bytes (no pre-hash — RFC 8032 PureEdDSA does SHA-512 internally).
    pub fn sign(&self, message: &[u8]) -> [u8; 64] {
        self.signing_key.sign(message).to_bytes()
    }
}

impl std::fmt::Debug for Ed25519Secret {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        // Never print the seed.
        f.debug_struct("Ed25519Secret")
            .field("pubkey_hex", &self.pubkey_hex())
            .finish()
    }
}

impl PartialEq for Ed25519Secret {
    fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
        self.signing_key.to_bytes() == other.signing_key.to_bytes()
    }
}
impl Eq for Ed25519Secret {}

pub fn dns_txt_name(identity: &Identity) -> Result<String> {
    if identity.scheme() != "dns" {
        return Err(KezError::InvalidIdentity(identity.to_string()));
    }

    Ok(format!("_kez.{}", identity.value()))
}

/// For a `nostr:npub1...` identity, return the 32-byte x-only pubkey as a
/// lowercase hex string. This is the form nostr relay filters require.
pub fn nostr_pubkey_hex(identity: &Identity) -> Result<String> {
    if identity.scheme() != "nostr" {
        return Err(KezError::InvalidIdentity(identity.to_string()));
    }
    let pk = decode_npub(identity.value())?;
    Ok(hex::encode(pk.serialize()))
}

pub fn dns_txt_value(claim: &SignedClaim) -> Result<String> {
    Ok(format!("kez1:{}", serde_json::to_string(claim)?))
}

pub fn parse_dns_txt_value(value: &str) -> Result<SignedClaim> {
    let json = value
        .strip_prefix("kez1:")
        .ok_or_else(|| KezError::InvalidIdentity("DNS TXT proof missing kez1 prefix".to_owned()))?;
    Ok(serde_json::from_str(json)?)
}

pub fn encode_compact_claim(claim: &SignedClaim) -> Result<String> {
    let json = serde_json::to_vec(claim)?;
    let compressed = zstd::encode_all(json.as_slice(), 3)?;
    Ok(format!(
        "{COMPACT_PROOF_PREFIX}{}",
        URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(compressed)
    ))
}

pub fn decode_compact_claim(value: &str) -> Result<SignedClaim> {
    let encoded = value
        .trim()
        .strip_prefix(COMPACT_PROOF_PREFIX)
        .ok_or_else(|| {
            KezError::InvalidIdentity("compact proof missing kez:z1 prefix".to_owned())
        })?;
    let compressed = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(encoded)?;
    let json = zstd::decode_all(compressed.as_slice())?;
    Ok(serde_json::from_slice(&json)?)
}

pub fn extract_markdown_proof(markdown: &str) -> Result<SignedClaim> {
    let fence = "```kez";
    let Some(start) = markdown.find(fence) else {
        return Err(KezError::InvalidIdentity(
            "missing ```kez proof block".to_owned(),
        ));
    };
    let body_start = start + fence.len();
    let Some(end) = markdown[body_start..].find("```") else {
        return Err(KezError::InvalidIdentity(
            "unterminated ```kez proof block".to_owned(),
        ));
    };
    let json = markdown[body_start..body_start + end].trim();
    Ok(serde_json::from_str(json)?)
}

pub fn canonical_bytes<T: Serialize>(value: &T) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    serde_jcs::to_vec(value).map_err(|err| KezError::CanonicalJson(err.to_string()))
}

pub fn from_json<T: DeserializeOwned>(json: &str) -> Result<T> {
    Ok(serde_json::from_str(json)?)
}

fn sign_jcs_schnorr_hex<T: Serialize>(payload: &T, signer: &NostrSecret) -> Result<String> {
    let digest = Sha256::digest(canonical_bytes(payload)?);
    let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(&digest)?;
    let secp = Secp256k1::new();
    let keypair = Keypair::from_secret_key(&secp, &signer.secret_key);
    let signature = secp.sign_schnorr_no_aux_rand(&msg, &keypair);
    Ok(hex::encode(signature.as_ref()))
}

/// Verify a `SignatureBlock` against an arbitrary payload. Dispatches on
/// `signature.alg`. Used by `SignedClaim::verify` and
/// `SignedSigchainEvent::verify` internally; downstream crates (e.g. the
/// chat-server's handle-registration verifier) call it for non-claim
/// payloads that share the envelope shape.
pub fn verify_envelope<T: Serialize>(
    payload: &T,
    signature: &SignatureBlock,
) -> Result<()> {
    match signature.alg.as_str() {
        NOSTR_SCHNORR_ALG => {
            verify_jcs_schnorr_hex(payload, signature.key.value(), &signature.sig)
        }
        ED25519_SHA512_ALG => {
            let jcs = canonical_bytes(payload)?;
            verify_ed25519_hex(signature.key.value(), &jcs, &signature.sig)
        }
        other => Err(KezError::UnsupportedAlgorithm(other.to_owned())),
    }
}

fn verify_jcs_schnorr_hex<T: Serialize>(payload: &T, npub: &str, sig: &str) -> Result<()> {
    let public_key = decode_npub(npub)?;
    let signature = Signature::from_slice(&hex::decode(sig)?)?;
    let digest = Sha256::digest(canonical_bytes(payload)?);
    let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(&digest)?;
    let secp = Secp256k1::verification_only();
    secp.verify_schnorr(&signature, &msg, &public_key)?;
    Ok(())
}

/// Verify a raw ed25519 signature (no JCS / no envelope wrapping).
///
/// `pubkey_hex` and `sig_hex` are lowercase-hex 32-byte and 64-byte values
/// respectively. `message` is the exact bytes the signer signed over.
/// Used by kez-chat-server for the per-request auth header — anywhere
/// outside the kez.claim / kez.handle_registration envelopes.
pub fn verify_ed25519_hex(pubkey_hex: &str, message: &[u8], sig_hex: &str) -> Result<()> {
    let pubkey_bytes: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(pubkey_hex)?
        .try_into()
        .map_err(|_| KezError::InvalidIdentity("ed25519 pubkey must be 32 bytes".to_owned()))?;
    let sig_bytes: [u8; 64] = hex::decode(sig_hex)?
        .try_into()
        .map_err(|_| KezError::InvalidSignature)?;
    let verifying_key = Ed25519VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pubkey_bytes)
        .map_err(|_| KezError::InvalidSignature)?;
    let signature = Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(&sig_bytes);
    verifying_key
        .verify_strict(message, &signature)
        .map_err(|_| KezError::InvalidSignature)
}

fn validate_npub(npub: &str) -> Result<()> {
    decode_npub(npub).map(|_| ())
}

fn validate_ed25519_hex(value: &str) -> Result<()> {
    if value.len() != 64 {
        return Err(KezError::InvalidIdentity(format!(
            "ed25519 pubkey must be 64 hex chars, got {} chars",
            value.len()
        )));
    }
    if !value.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) {
        return Err(KezError::InvalidIdentity(format!(
            "ed25519 pubkey must be lowercase hex: {value}"
        )));
    }
    Ok(())
}

fn decode_npub(npub: &str) -> Result<XOnlyPublicKey> {
    let (hrp, data, variant) = bech32::decode(npub)?;
    if hrp != "npub" || variant != Variant::Bech32 {
        return Err(KezError::InvalidNostrKey);
    }

    let bytes = Vec::<u8>::from_base32(&data)?;
    Ok(XOnlyPublicKey::from_slice(&bytes)?)
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn signs_and_verifies_claim() {
        let secret = NostrSecret::generate();
        let primary = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", secret.npub())).unwrap();
        let subject = Identity::parse("dns:jason.example.com").unwrap();
        let payload = ClaimPayload::new(subject, primary.clone(), Utc::now());

        let signed = SignedClaim::sign(payload, &secret).unwrap();
        let status = signed.verify().unwrap();

        assert_eq!(status.primary, primary);
        assert_eq!(status.status, "valid");
    }

    #[test]
    fn parses_bare_npub_as_nostr_identity() {
        let secret = NostrSecret::generate();
        let npub = secret.npub();
        let identity = Identity::parse(&npub).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(identity.as_str(), format!("nostr:{npub}"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trips_dns_txt_value() {
        let secret = NostrSecret::generate();
        let primary = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", secret.npub())).unwrap();
        let subject = Identity::parse("dns:jason.example.com").unwrap();
        let signed =
            SignedClaim::sign(ClaimPayload::new(subject, primary, Utc::now()), &secret).unwrap();

        let txt = dns_txt_value(&signed).unwrap();
        let parsed = parse_dns_txt_value(&txt).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(parsed, signed);
    }

    #[test]
    fn extracts_markdown_proof() {
        let secret = NostrSecret::generate();
        let primary = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", secret.npub())).unwrap();
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        let signed =
            SignedClaim::sign(ClaimPayload::new(subject, primary, Utc::now()), &secret).unwrap();

        let markdown = signed.to_markdown_proof().unwrap();
        let parsed = extract_markdown_proof(&markdown).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(parsed, signed);
    }

    #[test]
    fn round_trips_compact_claim() {
        let secret = NostrSecret::generate();
        let primary = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", secret.npub())).unwrap();
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        let signed =
            SignedClaim::sign(ClaimPayload::new(subject, primary, Utc::now()), &secret).unwrap();

        let compact = signed.to_compact().unwrap();
        let parsed = decode_compact_claim(&compact).unwrap();

        assert!(compact.starts_with(COMPACT_PROOF_PREFIX));
        assert_eq!(parsed, signed);
        parsed.verify().unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_claim_fails_verification() {
        let secret = NostrSecret::generate();
        let primary = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", secret.npub())).unwrap();
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        let mut signed =
            SignedClaim::sign(ClaimPayload::new(subject, primary, Utc::now()), &secret).unwrap();

        signed.payload.subject = Identity::parse("github:mallory").unwrap();

        assert!(signed.verify().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn identity_parse_rejects_invalid_inputs() {
        assert!(Identity::parse("").is_err(), "empty must fail");
        assert!(Identity::parse("   ").is_err(), "whitespace-only must fail");
        assert!(Identity::parse("no-colon").is_err(), "missing colon must fail");
        assert!(Identity::parse(":missing-scheme").is_err());
        assert!(Identity::parse("scheme:").is_err());
        assert!(
            Identity::parse("nostr:not-a-real-npub").is_err(),
            "nostr scheme must validate the npub"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn identity_parse_round_trips_scheme_and_value() {
        let id = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(id.scheme(), "github");
        assert_eq!(id.value(), "jason");
        assert_eq!(id.as_str(), "github:jason");
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_rejects_unsupported_algorithm() {
        let secret = NostrSecret::generate();
        let primary = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", secret.npub())).unwrap();
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        let mut signed =
            SignedClaim::sign(ClaimPayload::new(subject, primary, Utc::now()), &secret).unwrap();

        signed.signature.alg = "made-up-suite".to_owned();
        let err = signed.verify().unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, KezError::UnsupportedAlgorithm(_)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_rejects_signature_key_not_matching_primary() {
        let secret_a = NostrSecret::generate();
        let secret_b = NostrSecret::generate();
        let primary_a = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", secret_a.npub())).unwrap();
        let primary_b = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", secret_b.npub())).unwrap();
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        let mut signed = SignedClaim::sign(
            ClaimPayload::new(subject, primary_a.clone(), Utc::now()),
            &secret_a,
        )
        .unwrap();

        // Swap the envelope's declared signing key to a different identity.
        signed.signature.key = primary_b;
        assert!(signed.verify().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn nostr_pubkey_hex_returns_32_byte_lowercase() {
        let secret = NostrSecret::generate();
        let id = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", secret.npub())).unwrap();
        let hex_pk = nostr_pubkey_hex(&id).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(hex_pk.len(), 64, "x-only pubkey is 32 bytes = 64 hex chars");
        assert_eq!(hex_pk, hex_pk.to_lowercase());
    }

    #[test]
    fn nostr_pubkey_hex_rejects_non_nostr() {
        let id = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        assert!(nostr_pubkey_hex(&id).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn dns_txt_name_requires_dns_scheme() {
        let dns = Identity::parse("dns:jason.example.com").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(dns_txt_name(&dns).unwrap(), "_kez.jason.example.com");
        let github = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        assert!(dns_txt_name(&github).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn decode_compact_claim_rejects_missing_prefix() {
        assert!(decode_compact_claim("hello").is_err());
        assert!(decode_compact_claim("kez1:foo").is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn extract_markdown_proof_rejects_missing_or_unterminated_fence() {
        assert!(extract_markdown_proof("no fence here").is_err());
        assert!(extract_markdown_proof("```kez\n{ unterminated").is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn ed25519_round_trips_seed_hex() {
        let secret = Ed25519Secret::generate();
        let seed = secret.seed_hex();
        let restored = Ed25519Secret::from_seed_hex(&seed).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(restored.pubkey_hex(), secret.pubkey_hex());
        assert_eq!(restored, secret);
    }

    #[test]
    fn ed25519_identity_is_lowercase_hex() {
        let secret = Ed25519Secret::generate();
        let id = secret.identity().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(id.scheme(), "ed25519");
        assert_eq!(id.value().len(), 64);
        assert_eq!(id.value(), id.value().to_lowercase());
    }

    #[test]
    fn identity_parse_validates_ed25519_format() {
        assert!(Identity::parse("ed25519:tooshort").is_err());
        assert!(Identity::parse(&format!("ed25519:{}", "Z".repeat(64))).is_err());
        assert!(Identity::parse(&format!("ed25519:{}", "AB".repeat(32))).is_err()); // uppercase
        assert!(Identity::parse(&format!("ed25519:{}", "ab".repeat(32))).is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn signs_and_verifies_ed25519_claim() {
        let secret = Ed25519Secret::generate();
        let primary = secret.identity().unwrap();
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        let payload = ClaimPayload::new(subject.clone(), primary.clone(), Utc::now());

        let signed = SignedClaim::sign_ed25519(payload, &secret).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(signed.signature.alg, ED25519_SHA512_ALG);
        let status = signed.verify().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(status.primary, primary);
        assert_eq!(status.verified, vec![subject]);
        assert_eq!(status.status, "valid");
    }

    #[test]
    fn tampered_ed25519_claim_fails_verification() {
        let secret = Ed25519Secret::generate();
        let primary = secret.identity().unwrap();
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        let mut signed = SignedClaim::sign_ed25519(
            ClaimPayload::new(subject, primary, Utc::now()),
            &secret,
        )
        .unwrap();
        signed.payload.subject = Identity::parse("github:mallory").unwrap();
        assert!(signed.verify().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn ed25519_sign_with_unified_entry_point() {
        let secret = Ed25519Secret::generate();
        let primary = secret.identity().unwrap();
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        let payload = ClaimPayload::new(subject, primary, Utc::now());
        let signed = SignedClaim::sign_with(payload, Signer::Ed25519(&secret)).unwrap();
        signed.verify().unwrap();
    }

    // ── Sigchain ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    fn nostr_signer() -> (NostrSecret, Identity) {
        let s = NostrSecret::generate();
        let id = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", s.npub())).unwrap();
        (s, id)
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_appends_and_validates() {
        let (secret, primary) = nostr_signer();
        let mut chain = Sigchain::new(primary.clone());
        assert!(chain.is_empty());
        assert_eq!(chain.next_seq(), 0);

        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        chain
            .sign_add(subject.clone(), None, Signer::Nostr(&secret))
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(chain.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(chain.next_seq(), 1);
        assert!(chain.is_active(&subject));
        assert!(!chain.is_revoked(&subject));

        chain.validate().unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_revoke_flips_is_active() {
        let (secret, primary) = nostr_signer();
        let mut chain = Sigchain::new(primary);
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        chain
            .sign_add(subject.clone(), None, Signer::Nostr(&secret))
            .unwrap();
        chain
            .sign_revoke(subject.clone(), Signer::Nostr(&secret))
            .unwrap();
        assert!(chain.is_revoked(&subject));
        assert!(!chain.is_active(&subject));
        chain.validate().unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_rejects_wrong_primary() {
        let (secret_a, primary_a) = nostr_signer();
        let (_secret_b, primary_b) = nostr_signer();
        let mut chain = Sigchain::new(primary_a);
        // Build an event whose payload claims a different primary.
        let payload = SigchainEventPayload::new_add(
            primary_b,
            0,
            None,
            Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap(),
            None,
            Utc::now(),
        );
        let signed = SignedSigchainEvent::sign(payload, &secret_a).unwrap();
        let err = chain.append(signed).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, SigchainError::WrongPrimary { .. }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_rejects_seq_skip() {
        let (secret, primary) = nostr_signer();
        let mut chain = Sigchain::new(primary.clone());
        chain
            .sign_add(
                Identity::parse("github:a").unwrap(),
                None,
                Signer::Nostr(&secret),
            )
            .unwrap();
        // Hand-craft an event with seq=2 (skipping seq=1) but correct prev.
        let head_hash = chain.head_hash().unwrap();
        let payload = SigchainEventPayload::new_add(
            primary,
            2,
            head_hash,
            Identity::parse("github:b").unwrap(),
            None,
            Utc::now(),
        );
        let signed = SignedSigchainEvent::sign(payload, &secret).unwrap();
        let err = chain.append(signed).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, SigchainError::SeqMismatch { .. }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_rejects_bad_prev_hash() {
        let (secret, primary) = nostr_signer();
        let mut chain = Sigchain::new(primary.clone());
        chain
            .sign_add(
                Identity::parse("github:a").unwrap(),
                None,
                Signer::Nostr(&secret),
            )
            .unwrap();
        // seq=1 but with the wrong prev hash.
        let payload = SigchainEventPayload::new_add(
            primary,
            1,
            Some("sha256:0000".to_owned()),
            Identity::parse("github:b").unwrap(),
            None,
            Utc::now(),
        );
        let signed = SignedSigchainEvent::sign(payload, &secret).unwrap();
        let err = chain.append(signed).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, SigchainError::PrevMismatch { .. }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_round_trips_jsonl() {
        let (secret, primary) = nostr_signer();
        let mut chain = Sigchain::new(primary);
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        chain
            .sign_add(subject.clone(), None, Signer::Nostr(&secret))
            .unwrap();
        chain
            .sign_revoke(subject.clone(), Signer::Nostr(&secret))
            .unwrap();
        let jsonl = chain.to_jsonl().unwrap();
        let restored = Sigchain::from_jsonl(&jsonl).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(restored.events(), chain.events());
        assert!(restored.is_revoked(&subject));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_from_jsonl_detects_tamper() {
        let (secret, primary) = nostr_signer();
        let mut chain = Sigchain::new(primary);
        chain
            .sign_add(
                Identity::parse("github:a").unwrap(),
                None,
                Signer::Nostr(&secret),
            )
            .unwrap();
        chain
            .sign_add(
                Identity::parse("github:b").unwrap(),
                None,
                Signer::Nostr(&secret),
            )
            .unwrap();
        let mut jsonl = chain.to_jsonl().unwrap();
        // Flip a byte in the middle line's content.
        jsonl = jsonl.replacen("github:b", "github:c", 1);
        let err = Sigchain::from_jsonl(&jsonl).unwrap_err();
        // Either signature breaks first, or prev-hash check catches re-serialization.
        assert!(matches!(
            err,
            SigchainError::BadSignature(_) | SigchainError::PrevMismatch { .. }
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_round_trips_compact_bundle() {
        let (secret, primary) = nostr_signer();
        let mut chain = Sigchain::new(primary);
        chain
            .sign_add(
                Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap(),
                None,
                Signer::Nostr(&secret),
            )
            .unwrap();
        chain
            .sign_revoke(
                Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap(),
                Signer::Nostr(&secret),
            )
            .unwrap();
        let compact = chain.to_compact_bundle().unwrap();
        assert!(compact.starts_with(COMPACT_CHAIN_PREFIX));
        let restored = Sigchain::from_compact_bundle(&compact).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(restored.events(), chain.events());
    }

    #[test]
    fn nostr_secret_pubkey_hex_matches_nostr_pubkey_hex_helper() {
        let s = NostrSecret::generate();
        let id = Identity::parse(format!("nostr:{}", s.npub())).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(s.pubkey_hex(), nostr_pubkey_hex(&id).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn nostr_secret_sign_raw_produces_valid_64_byte_sig() {
        let s = NostrSecret::generate();
        let digest = [42u8; 32];
        let sig = s.sign_raw(&digest).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(sig.len(), 64);
        // Verifying with secp256k1 directly proves the sig is correct.
        let sig_obj = Signature::from_slice(&sig).unwrap();
        let pubkey = decode_npub(&s.npub()).unwrap();
        let msg = Message::from_digest_slice(&digest).unwrap();
        let secp = Secp256k1::verification_only();
        secp.verify_schnorr(&sig_obj, &msg, &pubkey).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn sigchain_works_with_ed25519_signer() {
        let secret = Ed25519Secret::generate();
        let primary = secret.identity().unwrap();
        let mut chain = Sigchain::new(primary);
        let subject = Identity::parse("github:jason").unwrap();
        chain
            .sign_add(subject.clone(), None, Signer::Ed25519(&secret))
            .unwrap();
        assert!(chain.is_active(&subject));
        chain.validate().unwrap();
    }
}