A multi-day batch covering: a security review punch list (Day 1-3),
the visual-encryption profile-picture feature, a fast deploy
infrastructure, ack resilience + UX polish, several nostr ecosystem
alignment changes, and a key server-independence fix.
Security review (Day 1)
- Envelope v2 (ephemeral x25519 per message; AAD-bound AES-GCM;
no plaintext from/to). Big metadata-leak fix flagged by reviews.
Forward secrecy at the per-message level; v1 decrypt kept for
a one-week migration window.
- Routing tag rename h → q (NIP-29 collision fix).
- Web Push payload now empty (was leaking recipient handle to FCM).
- Log demotion + process-instance salt-hash of handles so debug
logs don't permanently encode the social graph.
Security review (Day 2)
- Replay protection: SEEN_CAP 500 → 10_000 ids; reject events with
impossibly old/future created_at; openMessage enforces ±7d/+5min
freshness on plaintext sent_at.
- Reveal Recovery Phrase now requires a fresh passphrase prompt.
Verifies via the same unlockIdentity that the initial unlock
uses. Bonus: works for biometric-only sessions (recovers the
phrase that wasn't in memory before).
- POST /v1/messages per-IP rate limit (60/min, capacity 60, with
a periodic idle-bucket sweep). New rate_limit.rs module + tests.
Security review (Day 3 Option A)
- Unforgeable acks: kind-4244 events now carry a `kez-sig` tag,
the recipient's ed25519 signature over the acked event id.
Sender verifies against the conversation peer's KEZ primary.
Unsigned acks still accepted during the migration window.
- Default `since=` lookback shortened 7d → 48h (matches relay
retention).
- Bounded concurrency on push fanout: tokio::sync::Semaphore(32).
Security review (Day 3 Option B — nostr ecosystem alignment)
- NIP-65 (kind:10002): publish our relay list so other clients
can discover where to find us.
- NIP-42 AUTH: attachSigner / detachSigner wires the user's seed
into the relay pool so AUTH-gated relays (damus.io DMs) deliver.
- Minimal kind:0 baseline on first session unlock (unblocks
writes on relays that reject unknown pubkeys).
- Acks now include ["p", senderNostrPubkey] for NIP-25 / NIP-10
routing convention.
Web Push end-to-end
- Server-side nostr listener (nostr_listener.rs): the chat-server
subscribes to relays for every registered handle's addr, so
Web Push fires even when chat goes over nostr (the live default).
- Push fanout from messages.rs spawned with bounded concurrency.
- Empty payload (no recipient handle leaked to FCM).
- Self-heal endpoint GET /v1/push/subscriptions/:handle —
auto-re-registers a subscription if server lost it.
- Auto-enable push on first unlock (was opt-in toggle hunt).
- In-chat nudge banner + iOS PWA install hint.
Persistent sessions
- persistent-session.ts: AES-GCM encrypt seed under a
non-extractable IDB key, 30-day sliding-window TTL, restore on
every boot.
- Auto-fetch own kind:0 from nostr on a fresh device so the user
sees their own avatar without re-setting it.
Profile pictures + visual encryption
- Avatar component accepts a `picture` prop (data URL); falls
back to the deterministic identicon when absent.
- profile-store.ts: pick → resize to 256×256 JPEG → save locally
+ publish as NIP-01 kind:0.
- Visual encryption (visual-crypto.ts): keyed Fisher-Yates pixel
permutation + xoshiro256** PRNG. Output is a valid PNG with
scrambled content. Salt embedded as a #kez-visual-v1:<hex>
URL fragment.
- Default ON for new pictures. Strangers see colored noise on
public nostr; contacts see the real face.
- Per-recipient AES wraps embedded in kind:0 content
(kez_visual_keys map). The picture's symmetric key is wrapped
via the same SealedEnvelope crypto our DMs use.
- Self-wrap (sender wraps to their own primary too) so a fresh
device of the same user can descramble its own picture.
- Stranger-view preview thumbnail in Settings (the badge tucked
into the avatar's bottom-right corner — "this is what the
world sees").
- Tap-to-zoom: header avatar in a thread opens a fullscreen
overlay.
Peer-profile resolution
- peer-profile-store.ts: IDB-cached one-shot kind:0 fetch +
descramble.
- peer-profile-cell.svelte.ts: reactive mirror for UI.
- 6h bulk-scan staleness + force-refresh on thread open.
- Avatar usages in Messages.svelte pass peer.picture through.
Local-echo + delivery receipts
- Outbound messages render instantly with status="sending"; flip
to "sent" when ≥1 relay accepts; "delivered" (check-in-circle)
when recipient's client publishes an ack.
- SVG status icons inside the bubble; "via X" footer on outbound.
- Persistent pending-ack queue with retry on next session start.
- Catch-up scan (fetchAcksForEventIds) self-heals delivered
state on conversation open.
- markDeliveredByEventId verifies the ack signature.
Active-relay tracking + reply preference
- SimplePool.trackRelays = true. Capture first-to-accept on send
via Promise.any over per-relay publish promises.
- InboxMessage.via_relay set from pool.seenOn on receive.
- Conversation.peer_via_relay persisted on every inbound DM.
- sendMessage takes `preferRelay` and orders publish targets
accordingly. Acks bias the same way.
- "via relay.X" footer renders on outbound bubbles.
Conversation list polish
- Per-conversation `unread_count` on the Conversation type.
- Bumped on every genuinely-new inbound; reset on thread open.
- Accent-color pill badge in the sidebar (rounds at "99+").
Server-independence fix
- sendMessage skips the /v1/u/:handle lookup when the caller
passes recipientPrimary (which Messages.svelte does, from the
cached peer_primary on the conversation row). Chat over nostr
no longer breaks when the chat-server is down — only brand-new
conversations still need the directory lookup.
Relay set
- Added wss://relay.snort.social and wss://nostr.wine to the
default pool (was 3, now 5).
Fast-deploy infrastructure (new in this batch)
- Dockerfile gains an `export` scratch stage (extracts binary +
web/dist only).
- Dockerfile.runtime: tiny runtime image that COPYs prebuilt
artifacts — no rust/npm on the remote.
- docker-compose.fast.yml: compose override pointing chat-server
build at Dockerfile.runtime.
- .dockerignore: excludes target/, node_modules/, prebuilt/,
.buildx-cache/, .git, *.db. Critical: without this, an earlier
bug had the buildx cache nested under the build context and
blew up to 17GB by feeding itself into itself.
- Old: ~10 min remote build. New: 3–5 min local + 5s remote
runtime swap. Cache lives at ~/.cache/kez-chat-buildx
(outside any project tree).
UI polish (margins, layout, banners)
- Authenticated routes (Welcome / Settings / Identity / Dashboard
/ Claims / AddClaim) wrapped in max-w-2xl mx-auto px-4 py-6.
- WhatsApp-style chat bubbles: shrink-wrap to content, asymmetric
rounded corners, inline bottom-right timestamp.
- Push-notification nudge banner at top of /chats with iOS
install hint.
- Relay state popover off the "● live (N)" indicator.
WebAuthn biometric fix
- user.id now uses the raw 32-byte ed25519 pubkey (was the
72-byte "ed25519:<hex>" identity string, which exceeded
WebAuthn's 64-byte limit — Android Chrome rejected it with
"user handle exceeds 64 bytes").
Documentation
- kez-chat/TODO.md tracks every reviewer finding with status,
file:line references, and a phased plan. All Day 1-3 items
marked DONE; remaining roadmap items (Double Ratchet,
WebAuthn-gated rehydrate, addr rotation, NIP-65 peer-relay
fetch on send) documented for future sprints.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
207 lines
7.0 KiB
Rust
207 lines
7.0 KiB
Rust
//! Tiny per-IP token-bucket rate limiter.
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//!
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//! Currently used by `POST /v1/messages` to keep a single source from
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//! filling everyone's mailbox until disk fills (the v0.1 spam concern
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//! called out in messages.rs). Default rate: 60 messages/min per IP.
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//!
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//! Why not pull in `tower_governor` or `governor`? They're great
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//! crates but each adds 10+ transitive deps for what's structurally
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//! ~50 lines of code. We're already shipping nostr-sdk's dep tree;
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//! restraint here keeps the build snappy.
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//!
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//! Client IP resolution priority:
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//! 1. `CF-Connecting-IP` header — Cloudflare puts the real client
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//! IP here; we trust it because Cloudflare strips this header
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//! from anything that wasn't routed through our tunnel.
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//! 2. `X-Forwarded-For` (first hop) — fallback for non-Cloudflare
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//! deployments.
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//! 3. None — direct curl / loopback. Rate-limit by `0.0.0.0` so
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//! noisy test traffic still gets bucketed instead of bypassing.
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::net::IpAddr;
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
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use axum::http::HeaderMap;
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use tokio::sync::Mutex;
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/// One bucket per client. We store the residual token count + the
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/// last refill timestamp; on each `try_acquire` we compute how many
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/// tokens to add based on elapsed time, then either decrement or fail.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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struct Bucket {
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/// Tokens currently available.
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tokens: f64,
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/// Last time we refilled.
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last_refill: Instant,
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/// Most recent activity — used by the eviction sweep to drop
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/// long-cold buckets so the HashMap doesn't grow forever.
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last_seen: Instant,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
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pub struct RateLimitConfig {
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/// Bucket capacity (max burst). Once exhausted, callers fail
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/// fast until enough time passes to refill ≥1 token.
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pub capacity: u32,
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/// Refill rate in tokens per second.
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pub refill_per_sec: f64,
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/// Buckets idle longer than this get evicted on next sweep so
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/// short-lived clients don't pile up in memory.
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pub idle_ttl: Duration,
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}
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impl Default for RateLimitConfig {
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fn default() -> Self {
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Self {
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capacity: 60,
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refill_per_sec: 1.0, // = 60/min steady-state
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idle_ttl: Duration::from_secs(15 * 60),
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}
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}
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}
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/// Process-shared rate limiter. Cheap to clone (Arc inside).
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct RateLimiter {
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inner: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<IpAddr, Bucket>>>,
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config: RateLimitConfig,
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}
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impl RateLimiter {
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pub fn new(config: RateLimitConfig) -> Self {
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Self {
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inner: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
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config,
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}
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}
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/// Drain one token for `ip` if available. Returns `true` on
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/// success (caller may proceed) or `false` if rate-limited
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/// (caller should respond 429).
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pub async fn try_acquire(&self, ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
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let mut map = self.inner.lock().await;
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let now = Instant::now();
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let bucket = map.entry(ip).or_insert(Bucket {
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tokens: self.config.capacity as f64,
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last_refill: now,
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last_seen: now,
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});
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// Refill since last touch.
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let elapsed = now.saturating_duration_since(bucket.last_refill).as_secs_f64();
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bucket.tokens =
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(bucket.tokens + elapsed * self.config.refill_per_sec)
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.min(self.config.capacity as f64);
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bucket.last_refill = now;
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bucket.last_seen = now;
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if bucket.tokens >= 1.0 {
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bucket.tokens -= 1.0;
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true
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} else {
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false
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}
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}
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/// Periodically called by a background sweep to drop buckets
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/// for clients we haven't heard from in `idle_ttl`. Returns the
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/// number of buckets removed (diagnostic).
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pub async fn sweep(&self) -> usize {
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let now = Instant::now();
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let mut map = self.inner.lock().await;
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let before = map.len();
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map.retain(|_, b| now.saturating_duration_since(b.last_seen) < self.config.idle_ttl);
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before - map.len()
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}
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}
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/// Resolve the client IP from the request headers, with the
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/// Cloudflare-first priority documented above. Falls back to
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/// `0.0.0.0` if we can't extract anything sensible — that way
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/// direct curl traffic still gets rate-limited as a single
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/// "anonymous" client instead of bypassing entirely.
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pub fn client_ip_from_headers(headers: &HeaderMap) -> IpAddr {
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if let Some(v) = headers.get("CF-Connecting-IP").and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok()) {
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if let Ok(ip) = v.trim().parse::<IpAddr>() {
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return ip;
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}
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}
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if let Some(v) = headers.get("X-Forwarded-For").and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok()) {
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// X-Forwarded-For is a comma-separated list; the leftmost
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// value is the original client.
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if let Some(first) = v.split(',').next() {
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if let Ok(ip) = first.trim().parse::<IpAddr>() {
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return ip;
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}
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}
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}
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"0.0.0.0".parse().expect("0.0.0.0 is a valid IpAddr")
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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fn cfg_for_test() -> RateLimitConfig {
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RateLimitConfig {
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capacity: 3,
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refill_per_sec: 10.0,
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idle_ttl: Duration::from_secs(1),
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}
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn within_capacity_succeeds() {
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let rl = RateLimiter::new(cfg_for_test());
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let ip: IpAddr = "1.2.3.4".parse().unwrap();
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for _ in 0..3 {
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assert!(rl.try_acquire(ip).await);
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}
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn exhausting_capacity_fails_then_recovers() {
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let rl = RateLimiter::new(cfg_for_test());
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let ip: IpAddr = "1.2.3.4".parse().unwrap();
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for _ in 0..3 {
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assert!(rl.try_acquire(ip).await);
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}
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assert!(!rl.try_acquire(ip).await, "4th request should be rate-limited");
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// Refill rate is 10 tokens/sec → 1 token in 100ms.
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tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(150)).await;
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assert!(rl.try_acquire(ip).await);
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn separate_ips_have_separate_buckets() {
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let rl = RateLimiter::new(cfg_for_test());
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let a: IpAddr = "1.2.3.4".parse().unwrap();
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let b: IpAddr = "5.6.7.8".parse().unwrap();
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for _ in 0..3 {
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assert!(rl.try_acquire(a).await);
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}
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assert!(rl.try_acquire(b).await, "different IP should still have full bucket");
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}
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#[test]
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fn cf_header_wins_over_xff() {
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let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
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h.insert("CF-Connecting-IP", "9.9.9.9".parse().unwrap());
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h.insert("X-Forwarded-For", "8.8.8.8, 7.7.7.7".parse().unwrap());
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assert_eq!(client_ip_from_headers(&h).to_string(), "9.9.9.9");
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}
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#[test]
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fn xff_first_hop() {
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let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
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h.insert("X-Forwarded-For", "8.8.8.8, 7.7.7.7".parse().unwrap());
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assert_eq!(client_ip_from_headers(&h).to_string(), "8.8.8.8");
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}
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#[test]
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fn fallback_when_no_headers() {
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let h = HeaderMap::new();
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assert_eq!(client_ip_from_headers(&h).to_string(), "0.0.0.0");
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}
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}
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