Tudisco 7b8b136e92 plan(kez-chat): NATS is bundled in docker-compose, not in Rust code
Correcting an overcorrection. Previous version pushed NATS fully
external — "operator brings their own, we don't ship it." That went
too far. The right line is:

- NATS isn't *Rust code we wrote* — it's the official Go nats-server,
  separate process. We don't embed it. ✓ (unchanged)
- NATS *is* part of our deployment recipe — docker-compose includes a
  `nats` service alongside chat-server and sig-server so operators
  can `docker compose up` and have everything working.

This is the standard "we ship docker-compose with the dependencies
wired up" pattern (like projects that include Postgres in their
compose). Operators with existing NATS deployments can disable the
bundled service and set NATS_URL to their own broker.

Changes:

- §4.2 process diagram: NATS back inside the "our deployment" box,
  with a note that it's bundled-but-separable
- §4.3 docker-compose: nats service restored alongside chat-server
  and sig-server. Reference nats.conf path documented. Instructions
  for swapping in your own NATS broker.
- §6.4 NATS section retitled from "external dependency" to
  "bundled in compose, not in code." Same requirements (NATS 2.10+,
  JetStream, auth_callout) but framed as turn-key by default.
- Decisions-locked NATS row updated: "not in Rust code, yes in
  docker-compose; swap-able by config."
- §11 sequenced plan step 3: wire up the bundled nats service rather
  than "spin up a separate broker for dev."
- §12 summary: "we ship two Rust services PLUS a docker-compose
  recipe that includes nats-server."
- Appendix A trimmed: now just "running NATS standalone if you're
  iterating on chat-server in cargo watch and don't want the full
  compose stack." The full compose IS the standard dev setup.
2026-05-24 22:45:29 -06:00

KEZ

KEZ is a portable, decentralized identity graph. It lets a person say:

"These accounts, keys, domains, and identities are all me."

…without depending on any central authority. Every connection is proven by a cryptographic signature against a key the user already controls (a nostr key, an Ed25519 key, etc.), and the proofs are published in places only the claimed account itself can publish to (their gist, their DNS, their nostr relay event). Anyone can verify the graph without trusting a server.

Repository layout

.
├── SPEC.md              ← The protocol. Language-agnostic, normative.
├── rust/                ← Rust implementation (kez-core, kez-channels, kez-cli)
├── nodejs/              ← TypeScript/Node implementation (same shape, same CLI)
├── rust-sig-server/     ← Optional HTTP store for sigchains (axum + SQLite)
├── crosstest.sh         ← Interop test: artifacts move between implementations
└── README.md            ← (this file)

Two parallel implementations. Wire-compatible: a claim signed in Rust verifies in Node and vice versa. The cross-test harness proves it.

A separate rust-sig-server/ crate provides an optional HTTP storage tier for sigchains — useful when a user doesn't want to set up DNS/hosting/nostr, but never required; the protocol stays decentralized.

Documentation

Start here:

  • SPEC.md — the language-agnostic protocol spec (v0.2). Normative for every implementation.
  • rust/README.md — Rust implementation guide: crate layout (kez-core / kez-channels / kez-cli), full CLI reference, channel plugin model, library examples, and the gap list.
  • nodejs/README.md — Node/TypeScript port: same shape as Rust, npm workspaces layout, crypto stack rationale, CLI reference.
  • rust-sig-server/README.md — the optional storage server: API reference, no-auth design + threat model, deployment recipes (bare-metal, Docker, PaaS), and how channel-based publishing remains the fallback if the server is down.

Quick start

Rust

cd rust
cargo build
cargo test                                                # 99 tests
cargo install --path crates/kez-cli                       # → `kez` on PATH
kez verify id github:jason

Full guide: rust/README.md.

Node.js

cd nodejs
npm install
npm test                                                  # 91 tests
npm run cli -- verify id github:jason

Full guide: nodejs/README.md.

Sigchain storage server (optional)

cd rust-sig-server
cargo build --release
./target/release/kez-sig-server                           # listens on :7878

Full guide: rust-sig-server/README.md.

Cross-testing

./crosstest.sh

Runs 19 scenarios that swap implementations at the artifact boundary:

# Scenario
12 nostr-signed JSON claim, both directions
34 nostr-signed compact claim, both directions
56 nostr-signed markdown claim, both directions
78 nostr-signed DNS zone form, both directions
910 ed25519-signed JSON claim, both directions
1112 ed25519-signed compact claim, both directions
1314 ed25519-signed markdown claim, both directions
15 rust builds 3-event nostr sigchain → node parses + shows
16 rust-exported sigchain JSONL == node-exported JSONL (byte-identical)
17 node builds 3-event nostr sigchain → rust parses + shows
18 rust builds ed25519 sigchain → node parses + shows
19 node builds ed25519 sigchain → rust parses + shows

If all 19 pass: JCS canonicalization, both signature suites (BIP-340 Schnorr and Ed25519), the compact kez:z1: zstd+base64url encoding, the Markdown fence, the DNS TXT shape, and the sigchain JSONL bundle format are all byte-compatible across implementations.

Pass -v for verbose output (echoes intermediate commands and proofs).

What ships in v0.2

  • Five channel plugins in each implementation: dns:, github:, nostr:, bluesky:, ap: (alias mastodon:).
  • Four wire encodings: JSON, compact, Markdown fence, DNS TXT.
  • Two primary-key algorithms: nostr/secp256k1 Schnorr (BIP-340) and Ed25519 (RFC 8032).
  • JCS (RFC 8785) canonicalization for everything signed.
  • No API keys required for any channel.

What's not done yet

Tracked in rust/README.md and the spec:

  • verify id consulting the sigchain. Sigchain types, CLI commands (kez sigchain add/revoke/show/export/publish), and the storage server all exist. But proof verification doesn't yet fetch the chain to check for revocations — every verify is still a single one-shot proof check.
  • rotate and add_device sigchain ops.
  • expires_at enforcement during claim verify.
  • Typed VerificationStatus.status reflecting the five failure modes (valid / revoked / expired / unreachable / fork).
  • Auth-required publishers (GitHub gist, Bluesky, ActivityPub).

License

Dual-licensed under MIT or Apache-2.0.

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