Tudisco 111b23b94b feat(kez-chat): scaffold the home server (v0.1)
First runnable kez-chat-server binary plus its docker-compose deploy
recipe. Implements steps 2-3 of the document.md sequenced plan; the
rust-lib refactor (step 1) is deferred — chat-server path-deps on
rust/crates/kez-core for now, which works and matches what
rust-sig-server already does.

What's in this commit:

kez-core (1-line change)
- New public `verify_envelope<T>(payload, signature)` helper that
  dispatches Schnorr / Ed25519 / future suites by signature.alg.
  Used by chat-server's registration verifier; downstream value
  beyond chat-server too.

kez-chat-server (new crate)
- src/main.rs: tokio + axum + tracing entry; clap config; graceful
  Ctrl-C shutdown.
- src/lib.rs: re-exports so tests can drive the same router.
- src/config.rs: env/flag config (bind, db, server, sig_server_url,
  web_dir) with defaults sane for both dev and prod.
- src/error.rs: typed ApiError → structured JSON responses with
  stable error codes.
- src/store.rs: SQLite-backed handle registry, UNIQUE on both
  (handle) and (primary_id); race-safe via SQL primary key.
- src/handles.rs: username validation (length, charset, reserved
  list, must start with letter/digit).
- src/registration.rs: SignedRegistration envelope sharing KEZ's
  JCS canonical-bytes pattern; signature verification via the new
  kez-core helper; replay protection via ±5-minute clock skew check.
- src/api.rs: all six routes in one file —
    GET  /v1/healthz
    GET  /v1/u/:handle
    POST /v1/register
    GET  /.well-known/webfinger
    POST /internal/nats/auth   (501 stub for v0.1; wired up in v0.2)
    GET  /                     (placeholder HTML; ServeDir when web/dist exists)

tests/http.rs — 13 integration tests
- Stands up the real router on a random port; uses reqwest.
- Coverage: healthz, lookup-404, full register→lookup round-trip,
  duplicate-handle conflict, wrong-server rejection, reserved-name
  rejection, tampered-signature rejection, stale-timestamp rejection,
  WebFinger success + wrong-server-404, placeholder SPA renders,
  NATS callout 501, JCS determinism sanity.

deploy/
- Dockerfile: multi-stage build (rust:1.86-slim → debian:bookworm-slim).
  Build context is repo root so the path dep on kez-core resolves.
  Runtime image ~50 MB; runs as non-root uid 10001.
- Dockerfile.sig-server: same pattern for the existing
  rust-sig-server, so the stack builds from one git pull.
- docker-compose.yml: three services (chat-server + nats + sig-server)
  with named volumes for persistence. Ports: 6969 (chat HTTP),
  4222/8443/8222 (NATS native/ws/monitoring), 7878 (sig-server).
- nats.conf: WebSocket on 8443 for the browser SPA, JetStream
  enabled, auth_callout pointing at chat-server's
  /internal/nats/auth endpoint (issuer nkey is a placeholder — must
  be replaced with a real one before going live).

README.md
- Documents all endpoints with example bodies.
- Quick-start for both local dev and full Docker compose.
- Honest list of what's in v0.1 vs what's still stubbed.

Smoke-tested running on 127.0.0.1:6969:
  GET /v1/healthz       → {"server":"kez.lat","status":"ok","version":"0.1.0"}
  GET /                 → placeholder HTML rendering
  GET /v1/u/ghost       → 404
  POST /internal/nats/auth → 501 with "wired up in v0.2"

cargo test  → 13 passed.
cargo build --release → 19.6s, clean.
2026-05-24 23:36:53 -06:00

KEZ

KEZ is a portable, decentralized identity graph. It lets a person say:

"These accounts, keys, domains, and identities are all me."

…without depending on any central authority. Every connection is proven by a cryptographic signature against a key the user already controls (a nostr key, an Ed25519 key, etc.), and the proofs are published in places only the claimed account itself can publish to (their gist, their DNS, their nostr relay event). Anyone can verify the graph without trusting a server.

Repository layout

.
├── SPEC.md              ← The protocol. Language-agnostic, normative.
├── rust/                ← Rust implementation (kez-core, kez-channels, kez-cli)
├── nodejs/              ← TypeScript/Node implementation (same shape, same CLI)
├── rust-sig-server/     ← Optional HTTP store for sigchains (axum + SQLite)
├── crosstest.sh         ← Interop test: artifacts move between implementations
└── README.md            ← (this file)

Two parallel implementations. Wire-compatible: a claim signed in Rust verifies in Node and vice versa. The cross-test harness proves it.

A separate rust-sig-server/ crate provides an optional HTTP storage tier for sigchains — useful when a user doesn't want to set up DNS/hosting/nostr, but never required; the protocol stays decentralized.

Documentation

Start here:

  • SPEC.md — the language-agnostic protocol spec (v0.2). Normative for every implementation.
  • rust/README.md — Rust implementation guide: crate layout (kez-core / kez-channels / kez-cli), full CLI reference, channel plugin model, library examples, and the gap list.
  • nodejs/README.md — Node/TypeScript port: same shape as Rust, npm workspaces layout, crypto stack rationale, CLI reference.
  • rust-sig-server/README.md — the optional storage server: API reference, no-auth design + threat model, deployment recipes (bare-metal, Docker, PaaS), and how channel-based publishing remains the fallback if the server is down.

Quick start

Rust

cd rust
cargo build
cargo test                                                # 99 tests
cargo install --path crates/kez-cli                       # → `kez` on PATH
kez verify id github:jason

Full guide: rust/README.md.

Node.js

cd nodejs
npm install
npm test                                                  # 91 tests
npm run cli -- verify id github:jason

Full guide: nodejs/README.md.

Sigchain storage server (optional)

cd rust-sig-server
cargo build --release
./target/release/kez-sig-server                           # listens on :7878

Full guide: rust-sig-server/README.md.

Cross-testing

./crosstest.sh

Runs 19 scenarios that swap implementations at the artifact boundary:

# Scenario
12 nostr-signed JSON claim, both directions
34 nostr-signed compact claim, both directions
56 nostr-signed markdown claim, both directions
78 nostr-signed DNS zone form, both directions
910 ed25519-signed JSON claim, both directions
1112 ed25519-signed compact claim, both directions
1314 ed25519-signed markdown claim, both directions
15 rust builds 3-event nostr sigchain → node parses + shows
16 rust-exported sigchain JSONL == node-exported JSONL (byte-identical)
17 node builds 3-event nostr sigchain → rust parses + shows
18 rust builds ed25519 sigchain → node parses + shows
19 node builds ed25519 sigchain → rust parses + shows

If all 19 pass: JCS canonicalization, both signature suites (BIP-340 Schnorr and Ed25519), the compact kez:z1: zstd+base64url encoding, the Markdown fence, the DNS TXT shape, and the sigchain JSONL bundle format are all byte-compatible across implementations.

Pass -v for verbose output (echoes intermediate commands and proofs).

What ships in v0.2

  • Five channel plugins in each implementation: dns:, github:, nostr:, bluesky:, ap: (alias mastodon:).
  • Four wire encodings: JSON, compact, Markdown fence, DNS TXT.
  • Two primary-key algorithms: nostr/secp256k1 Schnorr (BIP-340) and Ed25519 (RFC 8032).
  • JCS (RFC 8785) canonicalization for everything signed.
  • No API keys required for any channel.

What's not done yet

Tracked in rust/README.md and the spec:

  • verify id consulting the sigchain. Sigchain types, CLI commands (kez sigchain add/revoke/show/export/publish), and the storage server all exist. But proof verification doesn't yet fetch the chain to check for revocations — every verify is still a single one-shot proof check.
  • rotate and add_device sigchain ops.
  • expires_at enforcement during claim verify.
  • Typed VerificationStatus.status reflecting the five failure modes (valid / revoked / expired / unreachable / fork).
  • Auth-required publishers (GitHub gist, Bluesky, ActivityPub).

License

Dual-licensed under MIT or Apache-2.0.

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